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CUBA

EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AMONG OAS COUNTRIES ON COMMUNIST
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE

I. Nature and Scope of the Problem

A. While there is some information available in certain countries, the illegal movement and clandestine activities of Communists in Latin America, particularly those who have been trained in Cuba, are not adequately covered by existing intelligence sources.


B. [redacted]

Effects

are being made by CIA, AID and the U.S. military services to improve this situation, but the progress has been slow in most cases and nonexistent in others. It has been found that the existing government in some countries [redacted]

[redacted] have no desire to build a competent career security service. There is apparently a fear that the existence of a competent service would interfere with future political activities of the members of the existing government in the event that they should find themselves on the outside looking in. There is no unity of viewpoint among the various existing intelligence services, and many of them have a tendency to yield to the temptation to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in neighboring countries who are opposed to the present government. Nevertheless, existing services of the Latin

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American countries can produce much useful intelligence on this subject with an increased effort.

D. The only secure and rapid communications facilities in Latin America are those of the U.S. Government and while these are being improved, the presently authorized augmentation of facilities has not yet been completed.

E. [redacted]

[redacted] U.S. military representatives have contacts with their counterparts.

F. U.S. experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in other areas has led to the conclusion that in almost all instances, bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than such multilateral arrangements [redacted]

[redacted] Nevertheless, experience has shown that such multilateral arrangements can be useful, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for the exchange of intelligence. [redacted]

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II. Recommended Courses of Action

Certain Courses of Action already recommended by this Committee and approved by higher authority in connection with the control of travel to Cuba have a direct bearing upon the matter of intelligence exchange. These include (1) the undertaking of an immediate study of the feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier; (2) an intensification of our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature and justious implications of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the requirement to protect our own intelligence system

Additional Courses of Action recommended are:

A. Intensify and increase

the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Establish such assistance programs in additional countries where it is found to be desirable from our point of view and acceptable to the country concerned.

B. Increase and refine the existing flow of counter-intelligence information

to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquarters, from both of which points further appropriate

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dissemination can be made.

C. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Communist activities.

D. Undertake appropriate actions [redacted] to bring about the creation, with U.S. participation, of a standing committee of senior representatives of intelligence and security services with a view to their establishing and guiding the activities of an appropriate mechanism for the multilateral exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence information regarding Communist subversive activities.

E. Continue and intensify current efforts to improve U.S. communications facilities throughout Latin America.

F. Increase the dissemination to Latin American governments, by all U.S. agencies concerned, of unclassified studies, reports and other information concerning Communist subversion.

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